On the role of money growth targeting under inflation targeting regime by Dai, Meixing
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
On the role of money growth targeting
under inflation targeting regime
Meixing Dai
BETA-Theme, University of Strasbourg, France
20. February 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13780/
MPRA Paper No. 13780, posted 6. March 2009 06:08 UTC
On the role of money growth targeting under inflation targeting 
regime
Meixing DAI*
BETA-Theme
University of Strasbourg, France
Abstract: The mainstream inflation-targeting literature makes the strong assumption that the 
central  bank can  exactly target the interest  rate  which  affects investment and consumption 
decisions and hence the money supply plays no role  in  the monetary policy strategy. This 
assumption is equivalent to admitting the perfect credibility of inflation target announced by 
the central bank, the perfect functioning of money and financial markets and that the central 
bank is willing to inject as much liquidity as the economic agents demand. Neither of these 
assumptions corresponds to the reality. In effect, the inflation expectations can not be easily 
anchored by the cheap talk of central bankers. On the other hand, the central bank may have 
many difficulties to target, in a context of financial instability, the interest rates which affect the 
real and financial decisions of private agents. We suggest that under inflation-targeting regime, 
money and credit markets vehicle the inflation expectations that can be anchored with a well-
specified  feedback money growth rule.  The  latter,  in  contrast  to the Friedman’s  k percent 
money growth rule, can help managing the inflation expectations in a manner to guarantee the 
dynamic stability of the economy. Furthermore, the model can be easily used to discuss the 
implications of the zero interest rate policy and the quantitative easing policy.
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1. Introduction
Over the last eighteen years, inflation targeting is increasingly becoming popular monetary 
policy regime among the central banks in the world since its initial adoption by the central 
bank of  New Zealand  in  1990.  It  has gained  more  and more  popularity  among academic 
economists and central bankers in a context of rapid financial liberalization and innovations, 
which causes the reported unstable relationship in the short run between monetary aggregates 
and inflation and hence the failure of monetary targeting. That leads Mishkin (1999) to present 
the inflation targeting, which can be implemented via an (optimal) interest rate rule, as being 
more  effective in  the control  of  inflation  than the monetary targeting and thus the natural 
successor of the latter. 
The emergence of inflation targeting in practice and in theory is clearly related to research 
on the interest rate rules since the 1990s to reflect best the fact that the central bank of the 
United States conducts the monetary policy by choosing the federal  funds rate (Goodfriend 
(1991)), a very short term nominal interest rate, and that central banks of other industrialized 
countries have a similar  behavior, including Bundesbank. The latter was considered since a 
long time as the classical example of a central bank which targets the monetary aggregates. 
This research were stimulated in particular by the discovery of Taylor (1993) which shows that 
simple  interest  rate  rules  seem to coincide  quantitatively with the behavior  of  the Federal 
Reserve  over  various  periods.  Conceptual  questions,  concerning  the  determination  of 
macroeconomic variables for a given interest rate rule, were tackled within various theoretical 
frameworks (Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), King (2000)).
All that research shares the same consensus, namely that the money and hence the credit do 
not have any crucial and constructive role to play in the monetary policy. In other words, the 
money  market  is  only  useful  for  determining  the  supply  of  money  which  responds 
endogenously to the demand of money, and hence can be largely ignored in making monetary 
policy decisions (Woodford (1998), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)). This consensus forged 
since  ten years  has substituted to the one forged by Milton  Friedman,  according to which 
inflation is “always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. However, the new consensus is 
confronted  to  timid  but  incessant  empirical  and  theoretical  contests  as  well  as  the  new 
challenges revealed by the present financial and economic crises. 
The experience of the 1970s showed that the inflation expectations of the public can lose 
their anchor in a context of high oil prices and depreciating US dollars. Monetary targeting 
such  as Milton  Friedman’s  k percent  money growth rule  was progressively  abandoned  by 
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central banks in favor of implicit interest rate rules like that discovered by Taylor (1993).1 To 
stabilize the inflation expectations, monetary authorities proactively increase (reduce) nominal 
interest rate when the evidence suggests that inflation will rise above (respectively fall below) 
some numerical objective.
By recommending the adoption of an interest rate rule  by the central  bank, economists 
advocate that the supply of money is automatically determined by the demand. In other words, 
the  monetary  authority  implicitly  confer  to  the  private  sector  the  following message:  any 
quantity of money that you wish at given nominal interest rate will be provided. Under these 
conditions,  a  badly  specified  interest  rate  rule  could  lead  to  the  existence  of  multiple 
equilibriums or Wicksellian-type dynamic instability. An important lesson of this literature is 
that,  to  avoid  the existence  of  multiple  equilibriums  as  well  as  Wicksellian-type  dynamic 
instability, it is necessary that the interest rate rule reacts in a sufficiently strong manner to the 
current or expected rate of inflation. 
Recently, by considering some of the leading arguments for assigning an important role to 
tracking the growth of monetary aggregates when making decisions about monetary policy, 
Woodford (2008) concludes that none of them provides an indisputable reason to assign a big 
role to monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy. For him, ignoring money does 
not mean returning towards conceptual framework that allows the high inflation of the 1970s. 
He also rejects the view according to which the models of inflation determination with no role 
for money are incomplete, or inconsistent with elementary economic principles. However, he 
stresses the importance of avoiding the traps which are the bad estimate of output gap and the 
ignorance of endogenous nature of inflation expectations. Consequently, it is necessary for the 
central bank to use all the sources of information to judge if the interest rate policy is consistent 
with the expected future trend of the economy (Svensson and Woodford (2005), Woodford 
(2008)).
Within the framework of IS-LM model (neo-classical synthesis or New Keynesian), there 
exist two conventional strategies to use equation LM as a not so indispensable accessory in the 
literature relating to the interest rate rules (King (2000)). The first uses LM to specify money 
supply rules and to compare them with interest rate rules. The second describes the monetary 
policy strategy using the interest rate rule and LM is used to determine the endogenous money 
supply. Within a static framework where the central bank adopts an interest rate rule, LM does 
not interact with other equations and has thus no importance in the absence of real balance 
effect. Moreover, the last effect is more hypothetical than real. 
1 In an interview, Milton Friedman admits that the use of the quantity of money as target was not a success (London 
(2003)).
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However,  as argued  by Romer  (2000),  one  area  in  which  both the IS-LM and IS-MP 
approaches (where MP stands for monetary policy, i.e. interest rate rule) may have simplified 
too  far  is  in  their  treatment  of  financial  markets.  In  both  approaches,  the only  feature  of 
financial markets that matters for the demand for goods is ‘the’ real interest rate that monetary 
policy  can  powerfully  and  directly  influence  as  the  central  bank  desires.  In  practice,  the 
demand for goods depends on interest rates that the central bank may not be able to control 
directly  and tenuously as  well  as  the level  of  credit  which  is  available  at  those  rates.  An 
analysis,  which  takes  more  carefully  account  of  the  impacts  of  various  developments  in 
financial  markets  on  the demand  for  goods  as  well  as  the mechanism  through  which  the 
monetary policy affects these interest rates and the level of credit, would highlight many of the 
difficulties and uncertainties of actual policy-making. 
Recent  experiences  of  monetary  policy  in  the  context  of  unprecedented  financial  and 
economic crises have shown that monetary policy defined in terms of interest rate rule may 
lose its effectiveness in stabilizing the financial markets and the economy. The zero interest 
rate policy coupled with the quantitative easing policy practiced previously by the central bank 
of Japan and now by the Fed implies that monetary aggregates have important role to play. The 
question  is  why the  central  bank,  paying  special  attention  to  monetary  aggregates  during 
financial crisis, must neglect them when the economy is booming. In this respect, the European 
central bank (ECB), with its two-pillar monetary policy strategy, may be better inspired. 
In this paper,  by adopting a more complicated view of financial markets, we will supply 
some new arguments  in  favor  of  the use  of  monetary aggregates  under  inflation  targeting 
regime and show how to do it. The approach that we adopt in this paper is narrowly related to 
some previous works (Dai (2007), Dai and Sidiropoulos (2009)) which consider also the use of 
money  growth  rules  under  the  inflation-targeting  regime  and  where  the  money  market  is 
considered as a link between different economic agents and a coordination device for their 
inflation expectations. One important point of the present paper is that the target of interest rate 
does not automatically become the interest rate practiced by lenders on the credit market. The 
transmission mechanism from the repo interest rate, to money market interest rate and then to 
the lending interest rate can break down due to macroeconomic and financial instability. When 
the monetary and financial markets are imperfect, the central bank can lose its control over the 
inflation expectations due to the fact that it controls with imperfect precision the liquidity that 
private banking and financial  sectors can also expand or reduce depending on expectations 
about future inflation and output. 
In the next section, we discuss why the role of money is important in the monetary policy 
strategy and why the inflation-targeting literature cannot neglect the money and discard the 
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monetary targeting without adopting some very strong assumptions about the functioning of 
money and financial markets. In the section after, we examine some lessons from the monetary 
targeting experiences and argue that inflation targeting can be submitted to similar problems. In 
the section 4, we incorporate money and credit markets in a simple New Keynesian model and 
specify a monetary policy strategy which consists to add a feedback money growth rule to the 
inflation targeting regime. In section 5, we discuss why the feedback money growth rule can be 
useful, in comparison with Friedman’s  k percent rule, in stabilizing dynamically the inflation 
expectations, under backward-looking or forward-looking solution. In section 6, we discuss 
how the framework can be easily used to discuss the zero interest rate and quantitative easing 
policies. We conclude in the last section. 
2. Why the money may be useful and important?
Even though the proponents of inflation targeting do not deny the long-run relationship 
(correlation)  between  monetary  aggregates  and  inflation,  they tend  to  neglect  or  deny the 
causality relationship which runs from monetary aggregates to inflation and hence the role of 
money as efficient instrument of controlling inflation. Under inflation targeting regime, the 
causality of the relationship can be inverted since the supply of money is  endogenous and 
automatically adapts to the evolutions of output and inflation. The inversion of causality cannot 
be achieved without making some implicit and explicit strong assumptions. 
Notably,  in  the  inflation-targeting  literature,  it  is  assumed  that  an  independent  and 
transparent central bank without inflation bias can credibly anchor the inflation expectations of 
private sector by fixing nominal interest rate. This assumption is equivalent to assume that the 
money market and financial  markets are perfectly functioning and hence can be put into a 
black box without loss of information. From many points of view, these assumptions are very 
questionable. 
Although  a  typical  interest  rate  rule  (Taylor  rule  or  optimal  interest  rate  rule)  can  be 
effective in anchoring the inflation expectations in certain models, the result is not robust with 
the modifications, weak but empirically plausible, of model specifications. In effect, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the correct model specifications (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2001, 2002a, b), Christiano and Rostagno (2001), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002, 2005)). 
Sharing this concern, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) describe two examples which 
illustrate in different manners how the money and the credit can be useful in the conduct of 
monetary policy. Their first example presents a channel for monetary policy on the supply side 
and creates the possibility that the inflation expectations lose their anchoring. Illustrated with 
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the  help  of  an  IS-LM model  augmented  of  a  supply  curve,  this  example  shows how the 
monitoring of money and credit can help anchoring the inflation expectations of private agents. 
Their second example, which recapitulates the analysis of Christiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno 
(2007), shows that a monetary policy which concentrates too narrowly on inflation can, in an 
unintended way, to contribute to reduce the welfare via cycles of expansion and depression in 
the real and financial variables.
Being aware of the importance of money and credit markets,  Benjamin Friedman (2003) 
also worries about abandoning the role of money and the analytical tool which is curve LM. He 
argues that such an abandonment makes more difficult to take into account how the functioning 
of banking system (and with it credit markets more generally) can affect the monetary policy 
and also leaves open the fundamental question in the way in which the central bank manages to 
fix the interest rate in the first place. Similarly, for Goodhart (2007), the central banks must still 
give attention  to the monetary aggregates,  in  particular  the growth rate  of  the bank credit 
allocated to the private sector.
Government and central bank might have incentive to care about the stability of monetary 
aggregates since there is an empirically proved strong long term relationship between inflation 
and money growth. Söderström (2005) demonstrates how a target for money growth can be 
beneficial for an inflation-targeting central bank acting under discretion. As the growth rate of 
money is closely related to the change in the interest rate and the growth of output, delegating a 
money growth target to the central bank makes discretionary policy more inertial, leading to 
better social outcomes. In comparing this delegation scheme with other schemes suggested in 
the literature, he finds that stabilizing money growth around a target can be a sensible strategy 
for monetary policy, although other delegation schemes are often more efficient.
In  a  dynamic  context,  central  bank  can  lose  the  capacity  of  controlling  inflation 
expectations with only the instrument of interest rate at its disposition. Independent central 
bank can verbally persuade the public that it has the firm intention of attaining its inflation 
target  by building  its  credibility  and  by making its  objective,  preferences  and  operational 
procedures,  data  and  economic  model  transparent  to  the  public.  But  due  to  economic 
uncertainty, model uncertainty or operational errors, the central bank cannot always attain its 
objective. This result may induce some doubts of the public  about the future realization of 
inflation target. Outside of equilibrium, the central bank has the risk of losing its persuasion 
power and all  the verbal persuasion efforts may not be sufficient to convince the public to 
adhere entirely to its monetary policy strategy (Dai (2007)).
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Furthermore, temporary but persistent shocks2 could make difficult the conduct of monetary 
policy only based on the control of interest rate. Workers, who have a finite horizon, could 
claim a compensation of fall in their purchasing power as soon as they observe a rise in the rate 
of inflation without awaiting the cancellation of current inflationary shocks by future shocks. In 
addition, the rational expectations based on information restrained to the goods market and the 
Philips  curve,  as  it  is  generally  admitted  in  the  research  on  inflation  targeting,  could 
irrelevantly reflect the expectation behavior of private agents. It is contrary to the essential idea 
of  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis,  which  stipulates  that  the  private  agents  use  any 
information available to form their expectations. Consequently, one can reasonably suppose 
that  information  concerning  the  money  and  credit  markets  is  used  by  the  private  sector. 
Considering the money market as device of coordination of private inflation expectations, Dai 
and Sidiropoulos (2003, 2005, 2009), Dai (2006, 2007), and Dai, Sidiropoulos and Spyromitros 
(2007) provide theoretical justifications of the utility of this market other than only determining 
in an endogenous way the money supply within a typical framework of inflation targeting. 
These theoretical concerns also found some empirical echoes which show that money is not 
superfluous. Milton Friedman (2005), using data covering three periods of expansion in the 
USA and Japan,  proves that the quantity of money exerts  a determining effect on national 
revenue and stock prices. Hafer, Haslag and Jones (2007) discover that there is a significant 
statistical  relationship between the delayed values of the money and the output, even when 
delayed values of real interest rate and output are taken into account. Adding the money into a 
dynamic IS model, Hafer and Jones (2008) find that money growth usually helps predicting the 
GDP and that the predictive power of short-term real interest rate is much lower than previous 
works have suggested. Their results imply that the omission of the money seems to come at a 
high cost for dynamic IS models like that employed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). 
To  understand  the  lacunae  in  the  mainstream  literature  studying  inflation  targeting  or 
interest  rate  rules,  consider  the  traditional  IS-LM  diagram.  By  assuming  that  money  is 
endogenous,  the inflation targeting literature  assumes that IS, LM and MP curves cross by 
divine  coincidence  at  the  same  equilibrium  point  (Figure  1).  The  MP  curve  represents 
monetary policy stipulated in terms of interest rate rule and can be represented by a horizontal 
line if  the interest rate rule  does not depend on output. In effect, by assuming that money 
supply automatically adjusts to demand,  whatever is  the interest rate chosen by the central 
bank, LM moves to cut the two other curves (IS and MP) at their point of intersection.
                                    
2 Random  shocks  can  also  take  the  appearance  of  persistent  shock  when  the  same  shock  repeats  itself 
consecutively.
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       Figure 1: Money supply is perfectly elastic.
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          Figure 2: Money supply is imperfectly elastic.
By  assuming  that  money  supply  adjusts  imperfectly  to  demand,  given  the  inflation 
expectations, it is possible that these three curves do not cross at the same point as illustrated in 
Figure 2 after that some shocks have disturbed the initial equilibrium and dislocated these three 
curves.  The  resulting  disequilibrium  could  lead  private  agents  to  modify  their  inflation 
expectations, allowing IS, LM and MP curves to shift so that, after some dynamic adjustment, 
these three curves cross again at the same equilibrium point.
As we have seen in the recent developments in financial markets, the central bank cannot 
easily control the interest rates (which correspond to the intersection point between IS and LM 
curves in Figure 2) at which the interbank loans and other lending are made. It can neither 
easily  control  the  inflation  expectations,  since  fear  of  deflation  and  hyperinflation 
simultaneously appears in the actual financial turmoil. Many central banks (some of them are 
explicit inflation targeter) have massively injected the central liquidity to stabilize the financial 
markets. However, they do not do a symmetrical work during the boom period, i.e. reducing 
the liquidity when the economy is expanding too quickly. This demonstrates why the neglect of 
money in the inflation-targeting framework is one of the lacunae in its theoretical foundations.
The mainstream theories of inflation targeting assume that money and financial markets are 
perfect, and the central bank is perfectly credible and transparent. In the absence of inflationary 
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bias and persistent shocks, these assumptions lead to the equality between the inflation target 
and the expected rate of inflation as well as the equality between the repo interest rate fixed by 
the central bank and the interest rate determined on financial markets. 
We contest the view popular  in the inflation-targeting literature  according to which  the 
central  bank can be assumed to be completely credible  in the sense that its inflation target 
automatically becomes the nominal anchor for current and future periods, thus evacuating the 
possibility that central bank could lack credibility and means to control inflation expectations. 
In  effect,  this  credibility  cannot  be  always  ensured  due  to  the  existence  of  financial  and 
economic  uncertainty.  For  example,  when  there  are  major  and  persistent  supply  shocks 
inducing an inflationary pressure,  the central  bank might  have difficulty to explain  why it 
cannot fight inflation without provoking either a fall of employment or a fall in real  wages 
during an extending period.
The inflation-targeting literature focuses on the imperfections on the supply-side of goods 
and services and is completely unaware of those on money and financial markets. In order to 
ignore the later, it is implicitly assumed that these markets, in particular the money market, are 
perfectly  functioning.  As  all  financial  assets  are  implicitly  assumed  to  be  perfectly 
substitutable, controlling only the repo interest rate is equivalent to controlling all other lending 
interest rates. Consequently, the curve of money supply coincides with that of money demand 
and one can completely ignore the existence of money and financial markets in the theoretical 
construction of inflation targeting. 
The assumption of imperfect money and financial markets allows understanding better the 
functioning of the economy and how a monetary policy is implemented. In effect, the central 
liquidity is not accessible at unlimited quantity because the central banks limit the quantity, the 
quality and the types of assets accepted as collateral as well as the types of financial institutions 
which have direct access to the central liquidity. That implies that there could be a potential 
imbalance (excess of liquidity or crisis of illiquidity) on the money market. Central  bank’s 
interventions defined in terms of injection or withdrawal of liquidity become essential. These 
interventions have the advantage of being more flexible  than the instrument of interest rate 
because the latter must generally follow a well defined trend and is only modifiable (except in 
the event of financial crisis) with much longer intervals separating two interest rate decisions. 
The failure of transmission mechanism running from the repo interest rate to other interest 
rates as well as the zero bound for nominal interest rate could greatly limit the possibility of 
actions through fixing the nominal interest rate for central banks adopting inflation targeting. A 
central bank too aggressive in reducing the repo interest rate can quickly find itself without 
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interest rate instrument and hence the means of sufficiently reducing the lending interest rates 
and anchoring the inflation expectations.
The imperfect money and financial markets hypothesis also gives a better account of the 
dynamic of inflation expectations. The evolutions of the expected rate of inflation deduced 
from the difference of return between the indexed and un-indexed obligations show that the 
inflation expectations are not as static as predicts the mainstream inflation targeting literature. 
Some introductive teachings treat the expected rate of inflation even as fixed in the presence of 
stochastic shocks (Romer (2000), Walsh (2002)). Using information from money market and 
financial  markets  generally  allows  improving  the  inflation  expectations  of  private  sector 
compared to the case where private sector uses only information extracted from the interest rate 
rule,  the Philips curve and the goods market equilibrium condition  as it  is admitted in the 
literature of interest rate rules and inflation targeting. 
By assuming imperfect financial markets, we admit that the target of lending interest rate, 
decided by the central bank and expressed as optimal interest rate rule and function of other 
variables in the inflation-targeting regime, cannot be directly fixed and is not always realized 
due to malfunctioning of money and financial markets or shocks affecting these markets. In 
effect, the central bank fixes the repo interest rate, which is determined by taking account of 
inflation and output targets and economic model (including money and financial markets). A 
modification of repo interest rate allows inducing a change in the interbank money market 
interest rate, affecting hence the lending interest rate determined on the credit or debt market at 
which  firms  and  consumers  can  borrow.  If  this  transmission  mechanism  is  perturbed  by 
exogenous  shocks  or  endogenous  instability,  adopting  monetary  targeting  under  inflation-
targeting regime may have some advantages in terms of monitoring the inflation expectations 
and controlling the money market interest rate and the lending interest rate. There is then some 
good  reasons  for  the  inflation-targeting  central  bank,  by  designing  an  appropriate  money 
growth rule, to flexibly monitor the level of liquidity in the monetary market and hence in the 
economy (i.e. to target other interest rates) and to control the inflation expectations in order to 
ensure the dynamic stability for the economy. 
The design of appropriate money growth rule is determinant for the success of monetary 
targeting  since  the  renowned  k percent  money  growth  rule  of  Milton  Friedman  is  not 
successful.  In effect, in an experiment of overlapping generations economies, Marimon and 
Sunder (1995) found no evidence that a ‘simple’ rule such as a constant growth of the money 
supply, can help coordinate agents’ beliefs and help stabilize the economy.
3. Monetary targeting versus inflation targeting
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The strategy of monetary targeting (or targeting of monetary aggregates) comprises three 
elements: reliance  on information  conveyed by a monetary aggregate  to conduct  monetary 
policy, announcement of targets for monetary aggregates, and some accountability mechanism 
to preclude large and systematic deviations from the monetary targets (Mishkin (2002)).
Monetary  targeting is  generally  associated  with  the  monetarism.  Even  though  the 
monetarism represents an important advance over prior conventional wisdom and the lessons 
learned  from the monetarist  controversy are  not  to forget,  it  has lost  its  steam in  modern 
development of monetary theory and policy. Woodford (2008) argues that the most important 
of these lessons,3 and the ones that are of continuing relevance to the conduct of policy today, 
are not dependent on the thesis of the importance of monetary aggregates. In other words, the 
ECB’s  continuing  emphasis  on  the  prominent  role  of  money  in  its  deliberations  is  not 
theoretically  well  justified.  It is  explained  by the concern  not to ignore  the lessons of the 
monetarist controversies of the 1960s and 1970s.
The monetary targeting experiences in major industrial countries are mitigated (Bernanke 
and  Mishkin  (1992),  Mishkin  and  Posen  (1997),  Mishkin  (2002)).  It  is  found  that  while 
Germany and Switzerland could be considered  successful monetary targeters, the monetary 
targeting was not particularly successful in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. 
There  are  two interpretations  for  why monetary targeting in  these three countries  was not 
successful in controlling inflation. The first is that because monetary targeting, as part of the 
central bank game playing, was not pursued seriously, it never had a chance to be successful. 
The second is that growing instability of the relationship between monetary aggregates and 
goal  variables  such  as  inflation  (or  nominal  income)  due  to  financial  liberalization  and 
innovations introduced since 1980s meant that this strategy was doomed to failure and indeed 
should not have been pursued seriously.
However, it is not by pure chance that the Bundesbank (and to some degree the National 
bank of Swiss) that took on board monetarist  teachings to the greatest extent, had the best 
performance with regard to inflation control in the 1970s and 1980s. The monetary aggregate 
chosen by the Germans was central bank money, which is less affected by the ulterior financial 
liberalization  and  innovations.  The  key  fact  which  may  explain  the  success  of  monetary 
targeting regimes in Germany and Switzerland is that the targeting regimes were very far from 
a Friedman-type monetary targeting rule.4 The latter implies that a monetary aggregate is kept 
on  a constant-growth-rate  path and is  the primary focus  of monetary policy.  In  effect,  the 
3 The most important lessons from the monetarism, according to Woodford (2008), are that monetary policy can do 
something about inflation,  the central  bank can reasonably be held accountable for controlling inflation and a 
verifiable commitment by the central bank to a non-inflationary policy is important.
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Bundesbank, could miss its targets in the short-run by allowing growth outside of its target 
ranges for periods as long as two to three years while subsequently reversing overshoots of its 
targets. 
Monetary  targeting frameworks  in  Germany  and  Switzerland  are  best  viewed  as  a 
mechanism for transparently communicating the strategy of monetary policy that focused on 
long-run  considerations  and  the  control  of  inflation,  and  as  a  means  for  increasing  the 
accountability of the central bank. The success stories of monetary targeting, in the case of 
Bundesbank and Swiss National Bank, are explained by some economists5 as due to that the 
monetary policy is actually closer in practice to inflation targeting than it is to Friedman-like 
monetary  targeting and thus  might  best  be  thought  of  as  “hybrid”  inflation  targeting.  The 
Bundesbank’s monetary targeting is quite similar to inflation targeting as it announced inflation 
target and transparently communicated to the public and market participants. Central bankers 
(Freedman, 1996; King, 1996) have also noted the close similarity in the use of central bank 
instruments and the reaction of central banks to news and shocks under inflation forecast and 
monetary targeting. That suggests that choice of one or other monetary regime does not seem to 
matter much for the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy. Empirically, inflation targeting 
seems to have made little if any difference for inflation and interest rate dynamics (or conduct 
of interest rate policy) in the countries that adopted this strategy in the 1990s (Groeneveld et  
al.,  1998;  Almeida  and Goodhart,  1998).  However,  using real-time data,  Gerberding  et al. 
(2005) find that the Bundesbank took its monetary targets seriously, but also responded to 
deviations of expected inflation and output growth from target.
The recent debate about monetary policy strategy generally opposes monetary targeting to 
inflation targeting and questions over whether the ECB has to move to full-fledged inflation 
targeting. Alesina et  al. (2001) argue that it is hard to see why the growth rate of M3 should 
have a special role and the ECB could improve its policy by adopting inflation targeting. The 
empirical  study  based  on  US data by  Rudebusch  and  Svensson  (2002)  has  revealed  that 
monetary targeting is quite inefficient, yielding both higher inflation and output variability and 
therefore,  there  is  no  support  for  the  prominent  role  given  to  money  growth  in  the 
Eurosystem’s  monetary policy  strategy.  Evans  and  Honkapohja  (2003)  have  shown  that 
Friedman’s  k-percent money supply rule performs poorly in  terms of welfare  compared  to 
optimal interest rate rule.6 For Laubach (2003), monetary targeting facilitates communication of 
4 Issing (1996) noted: “one of the secrets of success of the German policy of money-growth targeting was that ... it 
often did not feel bound by monetarist orthodoxy as far as its more technical details were concerned.”
5  See Clarida and Gertler (1997), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Bernanke and Mihov (1997), Laubach and Posen 
(1997), Clarida et al. (1998), Mishkin (1999, 2002) and Svensson (1999a, b, 2000).
6  However,  Friedman’s  rule can generate equilibriums that  are  determinate  and stable under learning. In  the 
contrary, open-loop interest rate rules are subject to indeterminacy and instability problems. Minford et al. (2003) 
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the central bank’s type. But, this advantage is outweighed for most parameter values by the 
advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. Cabos et al. (2003), using German 
data from the end of the Bretton Woods system until 1997, support also that control problems 
involved  in  targeting  broad  or  narrow  money  are  larger  than  for  direct  inflation  targets. 
Moreover, Gersbach and Hahn (2003) suggest that inflation targeting is superior to monetary 
targeting as it makes it easier for central banks to commit to low inflation. 
In  a  quite  consensual  manner,  the monetary  targeting is  too  quickly  pushed  out  as  a 
credible  monetary  policy  strategy.  In  practice,  the ECB continues  to  attach  importance  to 
monetary analysis in its two-pillar strategy. But it is theoretically contested by proponents of 
inflation targeting. One prominent and systematic attack of the two-pillar strategy is recently 
given by Woodford (2008).
Lessons  learned  from  monetary  targeting only  indicate  that  the  instability  of  the 
relationship between monetary aggregates and goal variables (inflation and nominal income) 
make monetary targeting problematic, but not necessarily the failure of monetary targeting. In 
the presence of instability relationship between instrument and goal variables, a central bank 
with high credibility can successfully stabilize inflation and output through monetary targeting 
if it is flexible, transparent and accountable (Mishkin (2002)). However, that includes too many 
conditions  and  explains  why many economists  argue  against  monetary  targeting  (Mishkin 
(1999)). 
One must  not  be  surprised  that the argument  used  against  monetary  targeting can  be 
returned against inflation targeting which uses nominal interest rate as instrument. In a context 
of financial instability, it is difficult to ignore the developments in money and financial markets 
and consider they have no influence on the monetary policy strategy which can be theoretically 
formulated  only on  the base of  New-Keynesian  Phillips  curve and IS curve.  In effect,  the 
relationship between nominal interest rate that the central bank can directly control and goal 
variables such as inflation and output gap can be very instable. If this is the case, it will become 
difficult for central  banks to credibly and transparently communicate their  monetary policy 
strategy in  the  framework  of  inflation  targeting.  Furthermore,  inflation  targeting  regimes, 
focusing on inflation and output targets, could lead to very ample movements in interest rates 
and consequently in monetary and financial aggregates and asset prices, creating difficulties for 
ulterior monetary policy decisions. That is actually the case in many developed and emerging 
market economies where many financial and real bubbles burst simultaneously. 
However, we do not argue against the use of inflation targeting regime. We consider that it 
is possible to combine monetary targeting with it as in Dai (2007) and Dai and Sidiropoulos 
compare Friedman’s k-percent money supply rule with Taylor’s rule to see how they are different. 
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(2009). Using this new monetary policy strategy, central banks could simultaneously dispose of 
two  policy  instruments  (repo  interest  rate  and  money  supply)  to  affront  an  increasingly 
uncertain economic environment. More instruments could allow stabilizing the economy with 
less social costs, particularly in the presence of possible dynamic instability or multiplicative 
uncertainties (Brainard (1967)).
4. The model
The economy is described by  a stylized new-Keynesian model (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999)):
piελpiβpi ttttt x ++Ε= +1 , with 10 <β< , 0>λ , (1)
x
ttt
c
tttt EixEx εpiϕ +−−= ++ )( 11 , with 0>ϕ , (2)
where tpi  ( 1−−≡ tt pp ) denotes the rate of inflation, tp  the general price level,  tx  the output 
gap (i.e.,  the log deviation  of output from its flexible-price  level),  cti  the nominal  lending 
interest rate at which non-financial private sector can borrow from banks.
Equation (1) represents the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, where the rate of inflation is 
related to the expected future rate of inflation ( 1+piΕ tt ) and current marginal cost, which is 
affected by the output gap. The inflation shock, piε t , is due to productivity disturbances.
Equation (2), an expectational IS curve, relates the current output gap to the expected future 
output gap ( 1+tt xE ), the real lending interest rate. The real lending interest rate is defined as the 
difference between the nominal lending interest rate and the expected future rate of inflation. In 
this model,  we assume that the individual  saver can save at  cti  if  she directly buys bonds 
emitted by firms, which offer a rate of return equal to cti . We assume that savers also save in a 
deposit account bearing no interests at banks and hence their intertemporal arbitrage between 
saving and present consumption depends only on  cti . The demand shock,  
x
tε , reflects either 
productivity  disturbances  which  affect  the  flexible-price  level  of  output  or,  equivalently, 
changes in the natural real interest rate.
The model is completed with money and credit market equilibrium conditions in the spirit 
of Bernanke and Blinder (1988):
l
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m
tttt ilxlphibpm ε+−=−+≡− 21 ,  with 0 , 21 >ll ,                (3)
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where  mti  is  the rate of interest  determined on  the money market at  which  the banks can 
refinance,  tm  represents the money supply,  tb  is the base money that the central bank can 
control,  ltε  is a random shock that could incorporate both money supply and money demand 
shocks,  ctε  is a random shock that could incorporate both credit  supply and credit demand 
shocks. The lending interest rate, cti , at which the banks lend, and firms and households borrow 
is determined on the credit market for given mti . 
Some modifications relative to the model of Bernanke and Blinder have been introduced to 
reflect  recent  developments  in  money  and  financial  markets.  Notably,  ample  disturbances 
affect the money market interest rate and the lending interest rate applied to the borrowing of 
non-financial private agents. We do not include public bonds in this model. The private bonds 
are assumed to be a perfect substitute to bank lending. Furthermore, in this model, it is the rate 
of interest mti (instead of the rate of return on the public bonds) which determines the demand 
and supply of liquidity on the money market. By simplification assumption, mti  does not affect 
consumption and investment decisions. 
Despite these simplifications, by giving a special attention to money and credit markets, we 
can quite realistically examine how the interest rate decision of the central bank makes its way 
into the economy and how the inflation expectations adjust in this process. 
In equation (3), it is assumed that the central bank has not a total control over the money 
supply. Financial market innovations (e.g. credit derivatives) and private equity activities could 
create important endogenous liquidity ( mthi ) that cannot be moped up by monetary policies 
except when higher  interest  rate undermines economic  growth, curtail  the flow of investor 
funds to “alternatives” and widen risk spreads in debt markets.7 Instead, if the central  bank 
desires, control can be exercised over a narrow monetary aggregate such as monetary base, and 
its variations are then associated with these in broader measures of money supply. The money 
supply  is  endogenous  but  it  is  imperfectly  elastic  as  the  banking  system will  increase  or 
decrease  the  internal  money  in  taking  account  of  money  market  interest  rate  as  well  as 
collateral, and will not satisfy the money demand whenever it appears. The link between the 
money supply and the base, used here as a second policy instrument besides nominal interest 
7  See “In the new liquidity factories, buyers must still beware” by M. El-Erian, president and chef executive of the 
Harvard Management Company, published in Financial Times, March 22, 2007.
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rate, is given by  mthibm += , where  b  is the (log) monetary base, and money multiplier  (
bm −  in log terms) is assumed to be an increasing function of money market interest rate (i.e. 
0>h ),  a  money-multiplier  disturbance  is  not  explicitly  considered  but  is  implicitly 
incorporated in  the shock  ltε . Equation (3) could arise  under  a financial  reserve system in 
which  excess  reserves  are  a decreasing function  of  interest  rate  (Modigliani  et  al.  (1970), 
McCallum and Hoehn (1983), Walsh (1999)). 
Equation  (4)  gives  the  condition  for  clearing  the  credit  market.  The  supply  of  loans 
decreases  with  mti  and  increases  with  
c
ti .  The  demand  of  loans  decreases  with  
c
ti .  The 
dependence of load demand on  tx  captures the transactions demand for credit, which might 
arise, for example, from working capital or liquidity considerations. 
Taking the difference between equation (3) and its equivalent in period 1−t  yields:
l
t
m
ttt
m
tt ilxlih εpiµ ∆+∆−∆=−∆+ 21 ,    (5) 
where 1−−=∆= tttt bbbµ . Equation (5) implies that, in average or at steady state, the monetary 
base growth rate µ  must be equal to the current and expected rates of inflation, adjusted for the 
growth rate of output, i.e.,  *1
*
1 xlxl
e ∆+=∆+= pipiµ . An inflation-targeting central bank can 
reinforce the credibility in its capacity of monitoring the inflation expectations by keeping an 
average  long-term  growth  rate  of  monetary  base  consistent  with  its  inflation  target,  i.e. 
*xT ∆+= piµ .  However,  monetary base targeting must  not be considered  as  a  unique  and 
independent  strategy  for  achieving  price  stability  by  stabilizing  inflation  around  a  given 
inflation target since it faces, as shown by Svensson (1999a), an unpleasant choice between 
being either inefficient and transparent or efficient and non-transparent. 
The model is closed with the specification of central bank’s objective function. The latter 
translates the behavior of the target variables into a welfare measure to guide the policy choice. 
We assume that this objective function is over the target variables  tx  and  tpi , and takes the 
form:
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where the parameter  α  is the relative weight on output deviations. The central  bank’s loss 
depends on output gap variability around of zero and inflation variability around of its constant 
target  Tpi  which can be zero or positive. Since  tx  is the output gap, the loss function takes 
potential output as the target. 
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The  minimization  of  loss  function  (6)  taking  account  of  the  Phillips  curve  given  by 
equations (1) leads to the following targeting rule in the sense of Svensson (2002): 
)( Tttx pipiα
λ
−−= , (7)
This rule is also valid for the next period, hence we have:
)( 11
T
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−−= ++ .       (8)
Using equations (1)-(2) and targeting rules (7)-(8), we obtain the following instrument rule 
in the sense of Svensson (2002): 
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The  optimal  target  of  lending  interest  rate,  cTti ,  corresponding  to  the  central  bank’s 
optimization  solution,  must  react  positively  to  the  expected  future  rate  of  inflation  if 
0)()( 22 >−−++ λααβλλααϕ . It reacts positively to variations in  Tpi , and shocks xtε  and 
piε t . The lending interest rate defined by equation (9) is not an instrument directly manipulated 
by the central bank. Given its target, the central bank must use some instruments to achieve it. 
One instrument is the repo interest rate that we have not explicitly modeled in this paper and 
we assume that it is the same as the money market interest rate as the central bank is resolute to 
counterbalance  any financial  perturbation  that can  cause the money market interest  rate to 
deviate significantly from the repo interest rate. 
In the inflation-targeting literature, it is assumed that the central bank directly controls the 
interest rate affecting the goods demand. In practice, controlling the interest rate which affects 
economic  agents’  decisions is  quite  indirect  and hence submitted to many disturbances  on 
money and credit markets. Generally, central banks manipulate the repo interest rate in order to 
influence the money market interest  rate and then through the mechanism of arbitrage the 
lending  interest  rate  on  the  credit  market,  which  is  determinant  for  consumption  and 
investment. Under normal financial market conditions, the money market interest rate is almost 
identical to the repo interest rate if the banking sector is considered as sound and transparent. 
Similarly, the lending interest rate in the credit market is not far higher than that practiced on 
the money market for short-term borrowing between banks. Consequently, it is indifferent to 
fix the repo interest rate so that cTt
m
t ii =  (if the central bank believes that the credit market is 
perfect) or cTt
c
t ii = . Then using equation (4), we can determine the other interest rate which is 
not targeted in the first place. 
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However, disturbances in financial and corporate sectors can create dislocation on financial 
markets and enlarge the difference between the repo interest rate, the money market interest 
rate  and  the  lending  interest  rate.  Furthermore,  absorbing  negative  disturbances  in  goods 
market may require a low lending interest rate which may not be within the reach of the central 
bank due to negative financial market disturbances and the zero-bound for the nominal repo 
interest rate. Non-orthodox monetary policy, such as the quantitative easing policy, must be 
used to ease the tension on the money market or more audaciously the credit market through 
strengthening banks’ balance sheet and/or buying private debts on the credit  market by the 
central bank or Treasury. 
During the last decade, even though inflation-targeting central banks’ principal objectives, 
i.e.  stabilization  of  inflation  and  output  gap,  are  relatively  well  achieved,  too  much 
disequilibrium on the financial markets has been accumulated, translating into bubbles in real 
and financial asset prices. One reason for this to happen repeatedly is that central banks do not 
give anymore  attention to the increase  in  the quantity of  money (or  liquidity)  and credits. 
However, they pay a particularly great attention to these aggregates when the financial system 
and the real economy are facing with the risk of collapsing. This asymmetrical behavior with 
regard to quantity of money and credits is at the origin of dramatic financial shocks that we live 
actually, with devastating effects on the real economy.
To avoid  large  self-inflicted  financial  shocks in  the future  without  rejecting the recent 
advances in the central banking such as inflation targeting which puts accents on central bank’s 
independence  and transparency,  one solution  is  to combine  the inflation  targeting with an 
appropriate  monetary  targeting  (Dai  (2007),  Dai  and  Sidiropoulos  (2009))  through  the 
specification  of  appropriate  money  growth  rules  which  are  compatible  with  the  dynamic 
stability of inflation expectations and asset prices. As we do not include asset prices in this 
simple model, we consider in the following how a well-specified feedback money growth rule 
can stabilize the inflation expectations, hence helping to stabilize the economy.
By manipulating only the repo interest rate to indirectly affect the lending interest rate, the 
central  bank has no credible  instrument of anchoring the inflation expectations besides the 
cheap talk about  its firm intention  to attain  its inflation  target.  The real  challenge appears 
whenever the economy is outside of equilibrium. When the rate of inflation moves away from 
the target announced by the central bank, verbal persuasion via the publication of the minutes, 
the monthly reports, the data, the procedures of decisions as well as the models used could be 
not  enough  to  convince  the public  to  adhere  to  the monetary  policy  of  the central  bank. 
Temporary but persistent shocks could make further difficult the conduct of monetary policy 
based only on the control of interest rate. In this context, private agents may find rational to 
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lose some precious time to collect all information about the economy to form their inflation 
expectations instead of using only the Phillips curve, IS curve and central bank’s targeting rule, 
not to say that using Phillips curve is also submitted to instability of the relationship in the 
long-run and some important pitfalls.
In this context, the central  bank might be able  to more effectively anchor  the inflation 
expectations by controlling the liquidity available in the financial system. Since the constant 
money  growth  rule  has  been  considered  as  failure  in  stabilizing  inflation  and  inflation 
expectations, we consider a feedback rule which reacts to output gap.8 
The central bank desires that the private sector believes in its objective even though shocks 
can  deviate  the  realized  rate  of  inflation  from its  inflation  target.  Knowing  that  the  non-
financial  private sector  scrutinizes  the money and financial  markets to find out the market 
inflation  expectations  before  determining  its  own  ones,  the  central  bank,  concerned  with 
ensuring  its  credibility,  controls  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply  (in  the  narrow 
definition) at a level, which in average is consistent with its inflation target. A money (base) 
growth rule can be specified to neutralize the shocks affecting the money market (if they are 
observable,  if not, we exclude them from the feedback money growth rule)  and to react to 
variation of output gap:
l
ttt x εµηµ ∆++∆= , with xlT ∆+= 1piµ .  (10)
This rule is similar to the one considered by Taylor (1985), McCallum (1988a, b), Judd and 
Motley (1991), Hess, Small and Brayton (1993), and Feldstein and Stock (1994). It is a variant 
of the Friedman’s k percent rule, adjusted for shocks affecting the money market and variation 
of output gap. It is implemented thanks to a kind of rationing or limitation of access to the 
central  liquidity  by the commercial  banks.  It  is  a  more  flexible  instrument  rule  since  the 
quantity of liquidity can be modified at every instant between two interest rate decisions by the 
central bank. It complements well the interest rate as another powerful instrument of monetary 
policy. In this monetary policy strategy of duo instruments, one admits that the money growth 
rate is maintained in the medium and long term at a level compatible with the inflation target of 
the central bank.9 The most important thing is that the value of η  must be chosen to ensure the 
dynamic stability of the adjustment process of inflation expectations.
By specifying a money growth rule, we introduce the possibility of endogenous and more 
complex adjustment of inflation expectations in this model. These expectations are not only 
8 For alternative feedback money growth rules in a framework which combines monetary targeting and inflation 
targeting, see Dai (2007).
9 Feldstein  and  Stock  (1996)  suggest  that,  with  periodic  adjustment,  a  monetary  aggregate  can  be  a  useful 
intermediate target. 
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concerned with inflation dynamics reflected in the Phillips curve and IS curve, but also these 
reflected in information concerning money and financial markets. 
The monetary targeting rule given by equation (10) implies that it is not necessary for the 
central  bank to scrupulously make the inflation target equal  to the growth rate of a chosen 
monetary aggregate, which may be subjected to exogenous shocks or even disturbances due to 
speculative  behaviors  of  financial  operators.  When  the  monetary  targeting  rule  is  well 
specified, the inflation target of the central bank is always realizable when the effects of shocks 
disappear. Although the expected and realized rates of inflation can be temporarily different 
from  the  inflation  target,  their  difference  will  decreases  since  the  dynamic  stability  is 
embedded in the economy through an appropriate control of money growth rate. Without this 
control, an exogenous change in the inflation expectations could lead the economy to deviate 
far from the equilibrium corresponding to the inflation and output objectives announced by the 
central bank. If the inflation target represents a potential nominal anchor of the economy, the 
control of money growth rate makes it more credible in the eyes of private agents and provides 
a kind of additional nominal anchor for their inflation expectations. Private agents could revise 
as fine as possible  their  inflation expectations given the state of the economy by using all 
available information, including that concerning the money and credit markets. 
5. The dynamics of inflation expectations under inflation-targeting regime with 
feedback money growth rule
Equilibrium solutions of endogenous variables can be easily determined once the expected 
future rate of inflation is determined. Consequently, we will not give more details about these 
solutions  and will  instead  focus  on  the dynamic  stability in  the adjustment  process  of  the 
expected rate of inflation. 
We assume that the central bank can target the optimal lending interest rate cTi  and exclude 
the possibility that the zero-bound for nominal interest rate is attained. Using equations (1)-(2) 
and the targeting rule (7), we solve the current rate of inflation and output gap as function of 
the expected future rate of inflation, inflation target, and supply shocks as follows: 
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Equation (11) can also be interpreted as a difference equation of inflation rate which relates 
the current rate of inflation to the expected future rate of inflation and inflation shocks. It can 
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be solved in a forward-looking manner. Consequently, in the inflation-targeting literature, the 
inflation dynamic is not interesting to examine and hence generally neglected. One criticism 
that can be addressed to the use of equation (11) to obtain solution of the expected rate of 
inflation  is  that  rational  economic  agents  are  not  so  rational  since  they  will  neglect  all 
information coming from money and credit markets. 
Given the target of lending interest rate,  cTti , the central bank must determine the money 
market interest rate that shall be attained through rule-based (and discretionary if necessary) 
variations  in  monetary  base.  Using equation  (4),  where  we substitute  cti  by  
cT
ti  given  by 
instrument rule (9) and eliminate tx  with the help of equation (12), we obtain:
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Following  a  variation  of  inflation  target  and  potential  output,  a  supply  shock  or  a  shock 
affecting the goods or credit markets (or eventually the money market if the monetary shock is 
not perfectly counterbalanced as is assumed in the money growth rule (10)), the private sector 
will revise its inflation expectations. In practice, shocks affecting money and credit markets can 
generate major dislocations on goods and labor markets as well as modification in inflation 
expectations. These shocks affect the goods markets through their effect on the lending interest 
rate at which the banks or investors lend to firms and households. And through this channel, 
they affect the level of current output, employment and inflation. Anyone who wants to form 
good  inflation  expectations  cannot  neglect  these  developments  since  inadequate  monetary 
policy  response  to  these  shocks  can  put  the  economy  either  on  diverging  inflationary  or 
deflationary paths for long times.
It is to notice that, in some introductive studies to inflation targeting (Romer, 2000; Walsh, 
2002),  by  excluding  equation  LM,  the  model  made  up  of  AS-AD-MP  equations  cannot 
generate a dynamic adjustment process for the expected rate of inflation. In effect, the expected 
rate of inflation is given by the inflation target of the central bank whatever is the nature of the 
random shock affecting the economy. The model becomes primarily static. In other words, the 
endogenous  variables  instantaneously  find  their  equilibrium  value.  The  instantaneous 
adjustment is far from being the case in practice, in particular  when the rate of inflation is 
weak.  In  effect,  empirical  studies  show inertia  in  the  adjustment  of  the  rate  of  inflation 
(Gordon,  1997).  Consequently,  even  the  inflation-targeting  central  bank  is  very  credible, 
private agents have no reason to stick to its announced inflation target when forming their 
inflation expectations. 
21
To reflect in the inflation-targeting framework the empirically observed inflation dynamics, 
one must  either  introduce  persistent shocks or  formulate  an  ad hoc difference  equation  of 
inflation in order to introduce a more realistic dynamic analysis of the current or expected rates 
of inflation.10
The way that we borrow here is very different from that adopted by the literature on the 
interest rate rules and the inflation-targeting. We admit in particular that the private agents use 
all information at their disposal to rationally form their inflation expectations, including that 
provided by the money and credit markets. This is translated by the use of equations (4)-(5) in 
our  analysis  of the dynamic  adjustment of  the expected  rate  of inflation,  which  also  takes 
account of other equations of the model, including the reaction function of the central bank. 
We admit that the expected rate of inflation is a predetermined variable so that it  cannot 
instantaneously adjust to its equilibrium value.11 This assumption is based on the fact that, in an 
environment of weak inflation, the adjustment of prices and wages and consequently that of 
inflation depend much on the price and wages contracts negotiated in  the past. Due to the 
relatively high adjustment costs compared to the rate of inflation, the instantaneous adjustment 
of prices and wages is not an advantageous action for private agents. The majority of them 
adopt a partial  adjustment as what is generally allowed in the New Keynesian models. The 
expected  rate  of  inflation,  which  partially  reflects  the  evolution  of  current  inflation,  must 
behave in the same manner. The expected rate of inflation, as implicitly reflected in the prices 
of inflation-indexed bonds, could show more stable evolution than the actual rate of inflation. 
Indeed, the rise of the rate of inflation in the euro area in 2008 involves only a moderate rise in 
the expected rate of inflation, translating the confidence of financial operators in the monetary 
policy of the ECB in the medium and long term, knowing that the ECB uses also the pillar of 
monetary analysis in its decision of monetary policy.
We  examine in the following the dynamic stability of inflation expectations adjustment 
process under forward-looking or backward-looking solutions respectively. 
Forward-looking expectations 
10 One can for example organize contests of forecasts where the best forecasters are rewarded, which makes it 
possible to have regular information on the inflation expectations of private agents. 
11 Assume that  the current  and expected rates of  inflation are predetermined variable is compatible  with the 
forward-looking rational  expectations. Indeed, in dynamic models with rational  expectations,  the adjustment of 
current and expected rates of inflation takes into account the impacts of all news on the equilibrium, even if they 
are not instantaneously and completely reflected in the expected inflation. See Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) for 
a similar assumption. This type of behaviour is more often observed in an environment of weak inflation. However,  
it is not good working assumption in episodes of high inflation or hyperinflation where the current and expected 
rates of inflation adjust very quickly.  
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Economic agents expect that the economy will behave in period 1+t  in a similar manner 
as in  the current  period  t .  The only difference  is  that they cannot  estimate exactly future 
monetary policy and shocks affecting different markets. Taking one period forward equations 
(5) and (10)-(13), using them together with equations (12)-(13) to eliminate other endogenous 
variables  except  expected rates of inflation,  and taking expectations of resulting difference 
equation, we obtain (Appendix):
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Recursively using equation (14) and assuming that future shocks are randomly distributed, 
the forward-looking solution of the expected rate of inflation for period 1+t  is given by:
tntt
n
tt ΘΩ
−Ε


Ω
−Ω
=Ε +++
1
1
1
2
1 pi
βϕκα
pi .    (15)
Given that the rate of inflation in period nt ++1  when ∞→n  is well controlled and thus not 
explosive, a convergent solution of 1+Ε ttpi  satisfying equation (15) exists if the eigenvalue has 
a modulus superior to unity, which is translated by:
11
2
<
Ω
−Ω βϕκα
.  (16)
If 0=η , i.e. the money growth rule defined by equation (10) is reduced to Friedman’s  k 
percent rule adjusted for change responding to shocks affecting the money market, we have 
00 >Ω ,  with  )]()()[)(()( 2222221110 λααβλλααϕδκαβϕλδαβϕλκ −−+++++++=Ω lhlhl . 
Then according to inequality (16), the expected rate of inflation is converging to its equilibrium 
solution if 01
2
0 >−Ω βϕκα . 
For 0>η , the stability condition defined by inequality (16) is always satisfied if we have 
simultaneously 01
2 >−Ω βϕκα  and 0>Ω . These conditions are satisfied at the same time, if 
η  is small enough so that 012 >−Ω βϕκα . That implies:
23
λ
αη −Φ+< 1l .  (17)
where  
1
22
2212 })]()()[({)(
αβλϕκ
λααβλλααϕδκαβλϕδ −−+++++
=Φ lh .  Condition  (17)  means  that  the central  bank 
must conceive a monetary targeting rule which do not respond excessively to the variation of 
output if  01
2
0 >−Ω βϕκα . A feedback rule has in this case the advantage of increasing the 
modulus  of  the  positive  eigenvalue  (i.e.  reducing  
Ω
−Ω 12βϕκα  since  =Ω
−Ω ')( 1
2
η
βϕκα  
02
2
1
223
<−
Ω
λκϕβα ) and increasing the speed of convergence.
Consider now the plausibility of the case where we have 01
2
0 <−Ω βϕκα , i.e.: 
}−−++++{+>− )]()()[()()( 22221211 λααβλλααϕδκαβλϕδλααβϕκ lhl . (alphacondi)
Condition (alphacondi) can be checked if the weight assigned by the central bank to the 
output  target,  α ,  is  sufficiently  high  (so  that  0)( 1 >− lλα ),  1κ  is  sufficiently  large,  λ  
sufficiently small, and the terms )( 2lh +  and )( 22 δκ +  are sufficiently small. We notice that 
the terms 1κ  and )( 2lh +  represent respectively how the supply and demand on the money and 
credit markets are sensible to the money market interest rate, and term  )( 22 δκ +  represents 
how the supply and demand on the credit market are sensible to the lending interest rate.
If  01
2
0 <−Ω βϕκα ,  then  Friedman’s  k percent  rule  help  for  anchoring  the  inflation 
expectations if  1
2
2
1
2 βϕκαβϕκα <Ω< .  If  2 1
2βϕκα<Ω ,  the economy will  not converge to the 
equilibrium and hence indeterminate.
Consider now the design of the feedback money growth rule by defining an interval  η  if 
01
2
0 <−Ω βϕκα . The latter implies that 01 <−Φ+ λ
αl . 
Case  1: Choosing  η  so  that  0>Ω ,  012 <−Ω βϕκα  and  condition  (16)  are  satisfied 
simultaneously. Condition 0>Ω  implies anther interval for η , i.e.: 
Φ+< 1lη .  (18)
Then condition (16) implies 11
2
−>Ω
−Ω βϕκα , that leads to 1
22 βϕκα>Ω  and hence:
λ
αη
21
−Φ+< l .  (19)
Furthermore, condition 01
2 <−Ω βϕκα  yields:
24
λ
αη −Φ+> 1l .  (20)
Combining conditions (18)-(20) leads to:
λ
αηλ
α
211
−Φ+<<−Φ+ ll . (21)
Condition (21) suggests that if 01
2
0 <−Ω βϕκα , then a feedback money growth rule with η  
neither too high nor too low help to anchor the inflation expectations. However, choosing a 
value for  η  in the interval defined in condition  (21) could reduce more or less the speed of 
convergence to the equilibrium. As 11
2
−>Ω
−Ω βϕκα  and an increase in η  will reduce the value 
of 
Ω
−Ω 12βϕκα  and the lattar nearer to 1− , it is better to choose a value for η  nearer the inferior 
limit given in inequality (21) in order to ensure a speedier convergence to the equilibrium. 
Case 2: Choosing  η  so that we have simultaneously  0>Ω  and  012 >−Ω βϕκα . These 
two  conditions  imply  that   λ
αη −Φ+< 1l  (see  condition  (17)).  The  condition 
01
2
0 <−Ω βϕκα  implies that 01 <−Φ+ λ
αl  and hence 0<η . Since 
Ω
−Ω 1
2βϕκα  decrease when 
η  increases,  by choosing a negative value for η  which is inferior but as close as possible to 
λ
α
−Φ+1l ,  we  make  the  dynamic  adjustment  process  stable  and  be  able  to  increase  at 
maximum the speed of convergence to the equilibrium as the central bank may desire.
Case 3: Fixing η  so that 0<Ω , i.e. 
Φ+> 1lη . (22)
Then, condition (16) yields 11
2
<Ω
−Ω βϕκα . The last condition cannot be checked since it leads to 
1
2βϕκα−Ω<Ω  or 012 >− βϕκα . 
The above discussion of dynamic stability conditions shows that a well-specified feedback 
money growth rule  is  necessary for  stabilizing inflation  expectations  when the money and 
credit  markets  have  certain  characteristics.  This  explains  why when  financial  innovations 
perturb the relationship between monetary aggregates and goal variables, simple approaches of 
monetary targeting which accompanies the fixation of repo interest rate by the central bank are 
not  successful.  In  contrast,  a  well-specified  feedback  rule  can  stabilize  dynamically  the 
economy and increase the speed of convergence to the equilibrium.
25
Backward-looking expectations
We assume that  private  agents do not automatically  take the central  bank’s  announced 
inflation target as a credible anchor of inflation expectations. We admit the view according to 
which,  in  relatively  unstable  environments,  they  base  their  forecasts  more  on  observed 
fluctuations than on the announcements of stabilizing monetary policies (Marimon and Sunder 
(1995)). The backward-looking solution of the expected rate of inflation corresponds well to 
this view. 
Taking the difference of equations (12)-(13), we obtain:
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Knowing that  0=∆ Tpi  and using equations (10)-(11) and (23)-(24) to eliminate  tpi ,  tµ , 
tx∆  and mti∆  in equation (5), we obtain the following difference equation for the expected rate 
of inflation after some arrangements of terms: 
1
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Under backward-looking  expectations,  the  adjustment  process  of  the  expected  rate  of 
inflation is stable if the modulus of the eigenvalue is inferior to unity:
 1
1
2 <
−Ω
Ω
βϕκα . (26)
When  0=η , we have always  00 >Ω . If  0120 >−Ω βϕκα , the stability condition (26) 
cannot be checked if we maintain 0=η  since 1200 βϕκα−Ω>Ω . The Friedman’s k percent 
money growth rule will fail to stabilize the inflation expectations around the inflation target 
announced by the central bank.
In contrast, the feedback money growth rule can stabilize the inflation expectations if η  is 
specified so that  0<Ω  and hence  01
2 <−Ω βϕκα . Consequently, we have  1
1
2 <
−Ω
Ω
βϕκα  and 
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hence the stability condition (26) is satisfied. To ensure 0<Ω  and hence the dynamic stability 
under backward-looking expectations, η  must satisfy the following condition:
Φ+> 1lη . (27)
By increasing η  to a value far greater than Φ+1l , the speed of convergence could be reduce 
since  
1
2βϕκα−Ω
Ω
 will be nearer to 1. So, we must keep  η  superior but as close as possible to 
Φ+1l .
Another  case  to  consider  is  that  when  0=η ,  we  have  simultaneously  00 >Ω  and 
01
2
0 <−Ω βϕκα .  Specifying  η  so  that  0>Ω ,  012 <−Ω βϕκα  and  condition  (26)  are 
simultaneously  checked.  The  condition  0>Ω  implies  condition  (18).  The  condition 
01
2 <−Ω βϕκα  is always true if η  is not too small, i.e.:
λ
αη −Φ+> 1l . (28)
The condition 01
2
0 <−Ω βϕκα  implies that the right hand of inequality (28) is negative. The 
stability  condition  (26)  implies  that  we  must  have  1
1
2 −>
−Ω
Ω
βϕκα ,  which  is  equivalent  to 
1
22 βϕκα>Ω . That yields: 
λ
αη
21
−Φ+< l . (29)
Combining conditions  (18) and (28)-(29) leads to the interval of  η  for which the dynamic 
stability is ensured:
λ
αηλ
α
211
−Φ+<<−Φ+ ll . (30)
Condition (30) is the same as condition (21) and implies that the growth rate must be defined 
over an interval with the lower limit being negative. Increasing the value of η  will increase the 
modulus  of  the eigenvalue  (i.e. increase  
1
2βϕκα−Ω
Ω  since  
')(
1
2 ηβϕκα−Ω
Ω 02
1
2
2
1
223
)(
>=
−Ω βϕκα
λκϕβα
)  and 
hence the speed of convergence. Consequently, in order to increase the speed of convergence, 
η  must be chosen to be as near as possible to λα21 −Φ+l .
Under backward-looking expectations, the dynamic stability of the economy can be ensured 
with a feedback money growth rule which responds positively and sufficiently to variations of 
output if the money and credit  markets and the structure of the real  economy have certain 
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characteristics (i.e. 0<Ω  and 01
2 <−Ω βϕκα ). However, the stability must be ensured by a 
feedback money growth rule which can react positively or negatively in a well-defined interval 
to variations  of  output  if  other  economic  and financial  conditions  prevail  (i.e.  0>Ω  and 
01
2 <−Ω βϕκα ). 
6. Zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing policy
Recent experiences of monetary policy at the Fed have shown that after having brought 
down the repo interest rate to zero, the quantitative easing policy is one of the last options that 
the central bank can use in a context of financial turmoil. There is no conceptual difficulty for 
discussing  these  two monetary  policies  in  our  framework,12 since  we consider  already  the 
money and credit markets while assuming that the central bank practices inflation targeting. In 
this section, we just briefly discuss how our framework allows examining such issues without 
fully carrying out the dynamic analysis as we have done before. 
We have admitted that the central bank targets the lending interest rate, but cannot directly 
fix this latter. It must make the desired change in the lending interest rate through its action on 
the money market by fixing the repo interest rate, which is not explicitly considered in our 
model and is implicitly assimilated to the money market interest rate. In effect, the repo interest 
rate and the money market interest rate can be assimilated if the financial institutions are solid 
and transparent. Otherwise, a risk premium might be applied to money market interest rate. 
However, the central bank or the Treasury can reduce the premium to zero by implicitly or 
explicitly guaranteeing all lending on the money market or by supplying an amount of liquidity 
as large as demanded by financial operators. 
In this model, the zero interest rate policy becomes necessary if the money market interest 
rate defined by equation (13) becomes zero or negative:
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Since there is zero bound for the nominal interest rate, then the central bank must fix: 
0=mti . (32)
As the zero interest rate policy cannot allow the realization of the optimal lending interest 
rate due to malfunctioning of the money and credit markets, the effective lending interest rate 
12 For a review of Japanese experience of zero interest rate policy coupled with quantitative easing policy, see 
Spiegel (2006).
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determined  by  the  credit  market  will  be  superior  to  the  target  of  lending  interest  rate 
determined by equation (9). Consequently, the targeting rule (9) will not be effective. Inflation 
expectations  dynamics  and equilibrium solutions  of economic  variables  are  determined  by 
equations (1)-(5), (10) and (32). 
The zero interest rate policy can correspond to a suboptimal equilibrium since it cannot 
always bring down the lending interest rate to a level which is optimal for the central bank. To 
make the monetary policy effective, when large negative shocks on financial markets imply a 
need  for  the  zero  interest  rate  policy,  the  quantitative  easing  policy  sometimes  becomes 
necessary. The quantitative easing policy, targeting the liquidity in the banking and financial 
system, is used in order to allow increasing the supply on the credit markets and so to bring 
down the lending interest rate to its target level. The quantitative easing policy can be directed 
to  the  money  market  only  or  the  money  and  credit  markets  simultaneously,  it  modifies 
equations (3)-(4) as follows: 
l
t
m
ttt
m
tt
m ilxlphibq ε+−=−++ 21 ,   (33)
c
t
c
tt
c
t
m
t
e ixiiq εδδκκ +−=+− 2121 , (34)
where  mq  and  eq  represent the discretionary injection of liquidity on the money and credit 
markets respectively. 
If the quantitative easing  policy is fully executed so that the target and effective lending 
interest rate are equalized (i.e.,  cTt
c
t ii = ) under the zero interest rate policy (i.e.,  0=
m
ti ), the 
economic system can be described by equations (10)-(12) and (33)-(34). These equations allow 
examining the adjustment dynamics of inflation expectations and determining the equilibrium 
solutions  of  endogenous  variables  under  the  zero  interest  rate  policy  coupled  with  the 
quantitative easing policy. 
7. Conclusion
In a closed economy New-Keynesian model in which we introduce imperfect money and 
credit markets, we have shown that inflation-targeting central banks have good reasons to use 
monetary targeting together with inflation targeting. Considering that the cheap talk of central 
bankers is not sufficient to ensure the announced inflation target as credible nominal anchor of 
private inflation expectations, and that the money growth rate can be adjusted more flexibly to 
answer to shocks affecting real as well as money and financial markets between two interest 
rate decisions by the central  bank, we defend the idea that the quantity of money must be 
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regulated with a rule  but not in the way conceived by Milton Friedman who proposes a  k 
percent money growth rule. This view find strong support in recent financial  and economic 
turmoil where many central banks massively inject liquidity in the financial system to avoid the 
collapse of financial and economic system and where using interest rate rule is not anymore 
sufficient. Another support is found in the long term relationship between money and inflation 
found in empirical  study, which is not a simple correlation but a causal relationship in this 
sense that a high growth rate of money supply will systematically lead to high inflation rate. A 
strict control of money supply allows always controlling the inflation rate in the medium and 
long term. 
The model is sufficiently rich so it allows illustrating the complex transmission mechanism 
of  monetary  policy,  which  may  be  perturbed  by  malfunctioning  of  the  money  and  credit 
markets or shocks affecting these markets. We can use it to explain why the central bank cannot 
control directly (and hence always perfectly) the lending interest rate which affects effectively 
the investment and consumption by modifying only the repo interest rate. We have shown that 
the inflation expectations are  not easily controlled  in  this framework as it  is  optimistically 
conceived  in  the mainstream literature  on interest  rate rules  and inflation-targeting.  As the 
central bank controls the growth of money supply by limiting the access to the central liquidity 
in order to ensure good functioning of money and credit markets, private agents will give much 
attention to this strategy and consider that future inflation depends narrowly on the monetary 
growth rule as well as developments in money and credit markets. A well-conceived money 
growth rule, according to the type of expectations (forward-looking or backward-looking) and 
depending  on  the  structural  parameters  of  the  economy,  can  help  anchor  the  inflation 
expectations and increase the speed of convergence to the equilibrium. Finally, our framework 
can be easily used to discuss the recent developments in the monetary policy strategy of the 
Fed which adopts quantitative easing policy after having adopted zero interest rate policy.
 
Appendix: The difference equation under forward-looking expectations
Taking one period forward equations (5) and (10)-(13) yields:
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Using equations (12)-(13) and (A4)-(A5) to calculate the following difference equations:
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Taking account of the assumption of constant inflation target,  i.e.  0=∆ Tpi , then using 
equations  (A2)-(A3)  and  (A6)-(A7)  to  eliminate  other  endogenous  variables  except  the 
expected rates of inflation in equation (5b), we obtain: 
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Taking mathematical expectations of equation (A8)conditional on information available at 
time  t and assuming that the best estimates at time  t of future shocks are zero, i.e.  lttE 1+ε =
piε 1+Ε tt =
c
tt 1+Ε ε = 01 =Ε +
x
ttε , we obtain: 
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Simplifying and rearranging the terms in equation (A9) leads to the difference equation (14). 
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